Moral Theory and the Consequentialism/Non-Consequentialism Distinction

Consequentialism is a focal point of discussion and a driving force behind developments in normative ethics. But recently, consequentialism has transformed. Some consequentialists have appealed to agent-relative axiologies (and corresponding agent-relative rankings) to model agent-centeredness – typically believed to be the hallmark of non-consequentialism – within a consequentialist framework. This way (known as “consequentializing”), they claim, just any moral theory can be converted into a deontically equivalent consequentialist counterpart. At the same time, other consequentialists have reformulated their accounts in terms of (a teleological conception of) reasons rather than value or goodness – thus letting go concepts that were once essential to (if not defining of) consequentialism.

Both developments render it possible to conceptualize consequentialism at a more abstract level. But the emergence of this “new wave consequentialism” raises questions for moral theorizing: What good is a very broad, abstract understanding of consequentialism? Does the class of non-consequentialist moral theories become empty? Is “consequentialism vs.non-consequentialism” still a useful distinction? Or are we really after something different? What is the primary concept in terms of which we should classify moral theories – “consequences”, “value”, “reasons”? This panel will address these questions.

Speakers:

• Vuko Andrić (Bayreuth)
• Annette Dufner (Bonn)
• Jan Gertken (HU Berlin)
• Tim Henning (Stuttgart)
• Paul Hurley (Claremont McKenna)
• Thomas Schmidt (HU Berlin)