E. E. Constance Jones and the Dualism of Practical Reason

In recent years, research interest in the philosophical work of E. E. Constance Jones (1848–1922) has increased. This renewed interest currently focuses primarily on her contributions to the philosophy of language. However, Jones also published extensively in the field of practical philosophy, particularly in normative ethics. Her contributions to practical philosophy are often overlooked, as people sometimes regarded them as mere reiterations of the views of her philosophical mentor and teacher, Henry Sidgwick (1837–1900). While Sidgwick’s influence on Jones’s moral philosophy is undeniable and pervasive, dismissing her as a mere follower of Sidgwick’s moral philosophy would be unjust. In fact, she engaged constructively with topics and concepts from Sidgwick’s philosophy, expanding and revising them in response to internal inconsistencies and external contemporary critiques. This is particularly evident in her contributions to the so-called Dualism of Practical Reason (DPR), which Sidgwick used to characterize the incompatibility between egoism/self-love and utilitarianism/benevolence.

In my talk, I intend to discuss Jones’s interpretation critically and proposed solution to the dualism based on a recently presented reconstruction. In a rare but highly instructive contribution to Jones’s practical philosophy, Ostertag and Favia outline how, in their view, Jones seeks to overcome the dualism by interpreting the conflict as a clash between two different directives or methods of action. However, I believe their reading faces two exegetical problems. My critique will serve as the starting point for an alternative proposal. Contrary to the view of these two commentators, I argue that Jones is not interested in solving the dualism. Instead, she focuses on its examination. Ultimately, I aim to question whether the DPR even constitutes a problem in her eyes. My approach will be as follows. Ostertag and Favia suggest that Jones’s approach to resolving the dualism aligns with Green’s attempt at reconciliation. Green sought to balance overall and general well-being by demonstrating that the two always coincide in his perfectionist ethics. Ostertag and Favia reconstruct his argument as follows: (i) my good consists in self-satisfaction; (ii) selfsatisfaction consists in realizing my rational capacities; (iii) realizing my rational capacities consists in willing the good of other people for their own sake; (iv) therefore, my good consists in willing the good of other people for their own sake. According to Ostertag and Favia, Jones adopts this pattern in her approach (2020: 15). However, Green’s solution fails to overcome the dualism. First, he does not provide proof that individual well-being coincides with overall well-being. Second, there is no textual evidence that Jones endorsed this approach. In an encyclopedia entry, Ostertag (2020) initially argues that Jones attempts to reconcile the two positions by demonstrating a presupposition, namely, that egoism presupposes utilitarianism. If egoism turns out to be false, utilitarianism can be neither true nor false. In Jones’s view, this relationship illustrates the compatibility of both positions. Jones indeed employs various characterizations of the relationship between egoism and utilitarianism, including that of presupposition. However, this proposal also misses the mark. Depending on the precise formulation of both positions, a presupposition is either not present or fails to achieve a reconciliation of the two positions.

My counterproposal critically engages with the characterization of the dualism as a presuppositional relationship. Contrary to Ostertag and Favia, I argue that, in Jones’s view, the relationship is one of “logical priority.” This term also appears in her work and describes a fixed philosophical concept characterized by Sidgwick as follows:

“[A] concept (or judgment) said to be logically prior to another requires to be made explicit before and so that the concept to which it is prior may be perfectly clear and distinct (or that the judgment may be arrived at by a perfectly cogent process of inference). In this sense, the notion of a straight line is logically prior to the notion of a triangle as a figure bounded by straight lines: and Euclid’s axiom relating to parallels is logically prior to his 29th proposition—it is a more elementary proposition without which the other cannot be cogently established.” (1905: 41)

As I see it, Jones ultimately aims to make the following points: When she speaks of logical priority, she seeks to explain the order in which we must grasp concepts. The concept of self-love is logically prior to that of benevolence in the sense that we can only understand the latter in relation to the former. However, this interpretation does not contribute to solving the dualism. I believe we should also reject Ostertag and Favia’s idea that Jones aims to present a solution to the dualism. In my view, she is primarily concerned with diagnosing why the dualism exists and why we are confronted with it. She considers the dualism fundamental (1894: 81; 1895: 36; 1903: 36–38), and all ethical theories must grapple with it. Indeed, her texts suggest that she attributes an explanatory function to the dualism itself.

Literature

• Constance Jones, E. E. (1894): Rational Hedonism. In: International Journal of Ethics 5 (1). pp. 79-97.
• Constance Jones, E. E. (1894-95): The Rationality of Hedonism. In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 3 (1). pp. 29-45.
• Constance Jones, E. E. (1906): Moore on Hedonism. In: International Journal of Ethics 16. pp. 429-464.
• Constance Jones, E. E. (1907): Practical Dualism. In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 18. pp. 317-328.
• Constance Jones, E. E. (1920): Henry Sidgwick. In: Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Volume 11. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. pp. 505-506.
• Favia, Amanda & Ostertag, Gary (2020): E. E. Constance Jones on the dualism of practical reason. In: British Journal for the History of Philosophy. p. 1-17.
• Ostertag, Gary (2020): Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• Sidgwick, Henry (1901/1981): The Methods of Ethics. 7th Edition. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett.
• Sidwgick, Henry (1905): Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant and Other Philosophical Lectures & Essays. London: MacMillan and Co.3